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"Justice must manifestly be seen to be done."'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, courts have admitted evidence in civil cases
without regard for the manner by which it was obtained by the
proponent. 2 Neither unlawful acts nor invasions of privacy have been
considerations in judicial determinations of admission into evidence.
Only in certain limited areas have legislatures acted to protect
individual privacy through prohibition against the interception 3 and
introduction into evidence of electronic communications.4
Nevertheless, a body of law or, perhaps more aptly stated, bodies of
laws, have developed in criminal cases excluding evidence because of
the manner in which it is obtained. Most notable is what is generically
known as the "exclusionary rule." It enforces the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee of "[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures" 5 by excluding from admission into
evidence in federal and state criminal prosecutions that which is
6
obtained in violation thereof by unlawful governmental action.
1. HENRY CECIL, INDEPENDENT WITNESS 63 (1963) (quoting an explanation
given by defendant's attorney as to why an exceptionally hard-nosed judge would
recuse himself as a result of an "accidental" encounter with and accompanying insult
by the defendant and his companion on the eve of trial).
2. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2183, at 7

(McNaughton rev. 1961).
3. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000) (making it unlawful to intercept an
electronic communication by means of a "device"). Many states have comparable
provisions.
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000) (providing that "no part" of any unlawfully
intercepted communication "may be received into evidence in any trial, hearing or
other proceeding").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment in its entirety reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
6. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (extending the exclusionary
rule to state criminal prosecutions in which unconstitutionally obtained evidence is
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Although the exclusionary rule based on Fourth Amendment protection
is perhaps the most commonly known, courts also exclude relevant
evidence based on other constitutional protections, such as confessions
given involuntarily 7 and statements made when a proper Miranda
warning has not been given. 8 However, these exclusionary rules are
limited to governmental actors and therefore are not considered
applicable to civil actions 9 nor to criminal prosecutions in which the
0
offered evidence has been unlawfully obtained by a private person.1
The judicially developed exclusionary rule initially had two
separate goals. One was to enforce the Fourth Amendment through
deterrence of illegal governmental action. The other was to preserve
judicial integrity by not allowing illegally obtained evidence as an
exercise of the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court.' 2 As the
Court considered issues such as whether the exclusionary rule was
applicable to state prosecutions, the basis of and rationale for the
exclusionary rule became increasingly important. A rule based upon
sought to be admitted, thereby reversing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949),
which had found the Fourth Amendment's exclusion of improperly obtained evidence
was not applicable to the states); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)
(relying solely on the Fourth Amendment in holding in a criminal prosecution that
exclusion is an appropriate sanction for seizure of private documents by federal agents
in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35
(1886) (holding the compelled production of private papers sought to be used in
evidence in a forfeiture proceeding to be violative of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against self-incrimination).
7. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966) (excluding
confessions from evidence because the "confessions were the involuntary end product
of coercive influences").
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). For a recent application of
Miranda,see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-33 (2000).
9. 8 WiGMORE, supra note 2, § 2183, at 1060 (2002-2 Supplement). The
civil/criminal distinction is overly simplified and does not adequately answer all
questions of applicability. For example, actions that are civil in form but have a quasicriminal element to them, such as forfeiture actions, have been held subject to the
exclusionary rule. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 697
(1965).
10. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921) (holding,
prior to Mapp, that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred where government
actors had not participated in the unlawful seizure of evidence by private actors).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 124, 127.
12. See discussion infra Parts V, VI.

628

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 22:3

supervisory powers would have no application upon the states, while a
rule based on the Fourth Amendment would be applicable to the states
by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 3 Consequently, deterrence
based on the Fourth Amendment became settled upon as the basis for
the "exclusionary rule," thereby allowing enforcement upon the states. 14
As a result, the importance of exclusion as a means to preserve judicial
integrity faded.
At the same time that the exclusionary rule applicable to
criminal prosecutions was developing, courts hearing civil cases also
were considering whether illegally obtained evidence should be
excluded. The majority of courts rejected exclusion in favor of the
traditional rule of admitting evidence without consideration of its
source. 15 A handful, however, did find that the illegality of the
proponent's actions warranted exclusion, but the legal bases for such
rulings were often ill-defined or not well articulated.' 6 While the
exclusionary rule based on the Fourth Amendment was held
inapplicable to civil cases involving unlawful actions of private
parties,17 exclusion for purposes of preserving judicial integrity was lost
in the shuffle and not fully considered.' 8 Therefore, it continues to be
the position of courts hearing civil actions to allow the admission of
evidence that has been illegally obtained by the proponent.' 9
This Article reexamines the matter from its inception, largely in
the context of adultery-based divorce actions, to the present day
widespread application. It argues that two changes in litigation and
society warrant reexamination of the doctrine. The first is that the
present broad scope of civil discovery obviates the need to resort to
illegally obtained evidence to aid the search for the truth. The second is
a change in how society views the equities of certain situations in which
illegally obtained evidence would be offered. While it was once viewed
that the illegally obtained evidence was necessary to expose the
wrongdoings of a party, a less stringent societal moral code combined
with an increased sense of personal privacy now outweighs the
perceived necessity to resort to illegally obtained evidence in order to
13. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. See People v. Owens, 623 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that
unconstitutionally obtained evidence is inadmissible in state courts after Mapp).
15. See discussion infra Parts IV, IX.
16. See infra notes 88-91, 109-14, 160-67 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Parts VIII, IX.
18. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
19. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2183, at 7.
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expose the perceived wrong. Therefore, if there is some cost to the
integrity of the legal system by admitting unlawfully obtained evidence,
this Article argues that it is not necessary for the system to bear that
cost when that which has been obtained illegally is available by other
lawful means.

1-[.

SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH IN CIVIL CASES WITH "EVERY

MAN'S EVIDENCE"

A.

The TraditionalDoctrine

"The incidentalillegality [in how the evidence was obtained] is
20
by no means condoned. It is merely ignored in this litigation."
Though admitting into evidence that which has come into the
possession of the proponent through unlawful action, especially his or
her own, raises issues as to the propriety of so doing, courts have not
languished over these questions and have traditionally admitted
evidence without regard as to how it was obtained.2 ' Some courts have
expressed concerns over allowing a litigant to gain advantage from an
unlawful act, as well as a concern over whether the integrity of the court
is compromised by admitting ill-gotten evidence. 22 Nevertheless, those
concerns have been trumped by a perceived need to admit all relevant
evidence as an aid in the search for the truth.23 Additional rationales for
20. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2183, at 7.

21. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2183, at 7 (stating that, traditionally, the
illegality of the manner in which evidence was obtained was ignored); CHARLES T.
McCORMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 137, at 291 (1954) (noting

that, until after the beginning of the twentieth century, the illegality of the means by
which evidence was procured was no grounds for objection to its admission).
22. See Sackler v. Sackler, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61, 65 (App. Div. 1962) (Christ, J.,
dissenting) ("It is a strange concept which would permit a court of law to encourage
the commission of illegal acts by honoring the fruits of the illegality, and which would
permit the perpetrator to win a lawsuit by deliberately violating the law."), af'd,203
N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1964).
23. See Rattray v. Rattray, 25 R. 315 (Sess. 1897) (Lord Traynor). In Rattray
Lord Traynor stated:
Nor am I moved by the consideration, urged by the defender, that by
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admitting illegally obtained evidence include a desire of courts to avoid
collateral litigation on how evidence was obtained 24 and findings by
courts that exclusion is unnecessary because of other remedies available
to the wronged party.25 However, the predominant notion has been that
all evidence, or "every man's evidence," no matter how it is obtained,
26
should be considered as part of the court's truth-finding function.
B.

Any Reason for Reexamination?

Ascertaining the truth as part of the resolution of a dispute is a
lofty, if not seductive, goal with which it is difficult to find fault.
Nevertheless, two factors speak to a reexamination of the traditional
rule. The first is that civil litigation is not as much a search for the truth
as it is a means of reaching an acceptable resolution of a dispute. The
second is that the public perception of the integrity of the judicial
system is compromised by the acceptance of evidence obtained by
unlawful means.
Regarding the first factor, in many ways it seems inaccurate to
admitting this letter as evidence I am acting contrary to good policy and
giving an encouragement to crime. The policy of the law in later years (and I
think a good policy) has been to admit almost all evidence which will throw
light on disputed facts and enable justice to be done; and as to
encouragement of crime, it is not much encouragement to a man to possess
himself unlawfully of a letter, if while being told that he may use the letter in
evidence, he is also told that he must go to prison for that which he has done
to get possession of it.
Id. at 318-19; see also Stevison v. Earnest, 80 I11. 513, 518 (1875) ("[W]hy shall a
record, although illegally taken from its proper place of custody and brought before
the Court, but otherwise free from suspicion, be held incompetent?").
24. See Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841) ("When
papers are offered in evidence, the court can take no notice how they were obtained,
whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral issue to determine
that question.").
25. See Williams v. State, 28 S.E. 624, 627 (Ga. 1897) ("[T]he most that any
branch of government can do [when evidence has been unlawfully obtained] is to
afford the citizen such redress as is possible, and bring the wrongdoer to account for
his unlawful conduct.").
26. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) ("'For more than three
centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the
words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man's evidence."') (quoting
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)).
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view civil litigation as a search for the truth. Instead, the litigation
process is a curious blend of adversarial sparring and compromise with
a goal geared more toward achieving a resolution of a dispute that is
acceptable to both the parties involved and to society as a whole than
toward ascertaining the truth. Both pleading and discovery involve an
adversarial process that does not pretend to actually discern the truth.
Notice pleading requires only a simple statement that does not have to
contain factual truths,27 but may not contain untruths.28 Compelled
discovery requires only the answers to questions asked, not an
explanation of the whole truth. 29 The recent additions to the discovery
process of initial disclosures could be viewed as an attempt to aid the
truth-seeking function of civil litigation. 30 However, the required
disclosures include only specified categories of information a party
"may use to support its claims and defenses." 3 1 Disclosure of adverse
information, even if it speaks to the truth, is not required. Yet amid this
adversarial dance, the pretrial process also seeks to involve the parties

in various procedures aimed at achieving a compromise settlement,
such as mediation and settlement conference. 32 The intention of such
procedures is to resolve the dispute rather than necessarily to expose the

27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set
out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim .... The illustrative forms
appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this.").
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1I(b)(3), (4) (requiring that allegations in written
documents have "evidentiary support" and that "denials of factual contentions are
warranted on the evidence").
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B) (providing sanction for failure to answer a
question propounded, but not for failure to state the whole truth unless specifically
requested by the right question having been asked).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring initial disclosures by adversaries
without the necessity of a discovery request from an opposing party). The initial
disclosures provision was added in 1993 and amended in 2000.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (B) (requiring initial disclosure of
individuals "likely to have discoverable information" and "documents, data
compilations, and tangible things" that a party "may use to support its claims or
defenses").
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) (making "settlement and the use of special
procedures to assist in resolving the dispute" areas in which "the court may take
appropriate action" during pre-trial conference).

632
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33

The process of civil litigation appears to be more aimed toward
attaining a resolution than ascertaining the truth. Otherwise, how is it
that we ask juries to reach conclusions by a preponderance of the
evidence? We do not ask them to arrive at the truth. We ask juries to
determine what they think was more likely to have happened. Of
course, the truth-in all its unwashed or illegally obtained formwould certainly aid that determination. But is it a goal of litigation that
trumps all other concerns? Or, do other goals, such as not rewarding or
countenancing illegal behavior, outweigh the need to consider "every
man's evidence"? 34 We denyjuries access to other evidence in order to
foster social policies, such as protecting professional relationships by
means of evidentiary privilege 35 or encouraging responsible behavior by
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures. 36 If civil
litigation is viewed as a search for truth, then it would seem to follow
that all evidence should be allowed if it aids in that determination.
Even so, however, the truth-seeking function does not trump the
societal goals we seek to foster through the concepts of privileges and
exclusionary rules of evidence. Therefore, if the purpose of civil
litigation is to provide resolution of a dispute in a manner that is
deemed acceptable to both society and the parties, then evidentiary
exclusions and privileges have an even more justifiable role.
The dilemma posed by illegally obtained evidence is quite
similar to that of privileges and exclusions. If there is a cost to the
integrity of the judicial system by accepting illegally obtained evidence,
we must consider whether that cost is justified. Excluding the evidence
may hinder ascertaining the truth, but so do rules of exclusion and
privilege. Because they serve desirable societal goals, whatever
hindrance they cause to truth-seeking is justified. When litigation is
viewed more as an acceptable dispute resolution than as a truth-seeking
endeavor, that justification is even more acceptable. However, that is
33. See generally Owen M. Fiss, AgainstSettlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)
(questioning the settlements produced by pre-trial procedures).
34. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,331 (1950) (discussing exemptions
from testifying before a tribunal and commenting that "every such exemption is
grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through centuries
of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for the truth").
35. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing that the privilege of a witness shall be
governed by common law, such as attorney-client privilege and physician-patient
privilege).
36. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
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really only the case if one accepts that there is a compromise to judicial
integrity in considering illegally obtained evidence.
The second factor discusses whether there is a cost to the public
judicial system when a disputant benefits from its illegal act by
introducing evidence to support its case that has been unlawfully
obtained. I believe that there is. As this Article discusses, the waning
of the judicial integrity rationale as one of the bases for the exclusionary
rule occurred as a matter of judicial expediency in order to enforce
Fourth Amendment guarantees in the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. 37 Nevertheless, the concern for judicial integrity was
never disputed nor abandoned.38 Therefore, if one accepts that there is
a cost to the integrity of the judicial system as a result of the admission
of illegally obtained evidence, one must consider whether that cost is
actually necessary as a means to the truth. In a system of civil
procedure with an extremely broad scope of discovery, the compromise
to the judicial system is not necessary in order to arrive at the truth. As
this Article discusses, the "smoking gun" memo should be revealed in
response to a request to produce; theft of the document should not be
necessary.39 The adulterous activity should be exposed during 4 a0
deposition and not in a photograph taken by breaking and entering.
When we allow illegally obtained evidence, we are assuming it is
necessary because the party against whom it is offered will be evasive
or dishonest in discovery. We condone an illegal act in order to counter
the possibility of a dishonest act. At the risk of being trite, the question
4
in the world of litigation becomes this: do two wrongs make a right?
37. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
38. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting) ("If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, itbreeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."). But see JOHN
W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 165, at 246 (5th ed. 1999) (arguing that
Brandeis's view that the integrity of courts is compromised by admitting illegally
obtained evidence "may simply be inconsistent with reality").
39. See infra notes 49-50, 173-78 and accompanying text.

40. See discussion infra Part III.C.
41. In constructing a system of public dispute resolution, it is an interesting

dilemma to consider what should be presumed about the litigants. Should legal
principles be constructed upon the assumption that no one can be trusted? If so, a
counterbalancing of two wrongs may indeed make a right. Or do we proceed from the
assumption that parties availing themselves of the system will play by the rules, and
that if they do not, the applicable mechanisms of enforcement are adequate to address
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This point hinges on the perceived equities involved in the individual
case. In some situations, our view of the defendant as a bad actor
justifies the breach of the law in order to expose the wrong that might
otherwise never be revealed. However, when our perception of the
equities involved changes, so does our view of whether the illegal act is
justified. In other situations, the illegal evidence maybe offered against
a sympathetic person. The wrong that is exposed with the illegal
evidence may be perceived by society to be relatively benign and,
therefore, not ajustification for countenancing an illegal act in order to
reveal the truth. As will be discussed, the traditional rule of admitting
illegally obtained evidence developed in the context of adultery at a
time when the equities involved justified allowing the evidence to
expose a wrongdoing. However, changing times change society's view
of the equities involved. Consequently, setting the reexamination into
several contexts may help further the discussion.

ET.

CONTEXTS FOR DISCUSSION

For purposes of considering the continued propriety of admitting
illegally obtained evidence, I have selected three scenarios as contexts
for analysis. In choosing them, I have striven to select simple, 42 yet
realistic, situations that admittedly may blur state and federal actions.
Because my simple premise is that there is an unnecessary cost to the
public system of civil justice in admitting illegally obtained evidence, I
believe that premise holds equally true in both state and federal court.
Therefore, my examples and discussion will consider the two
interchangeably. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but I
believe they adequately frame the main issues for discussion: (1)
whether the resultant action could be filed without the evidence; (2)
whether the evidence advances a presently filed case; (3) whether the
evidence would be available by legitimate means, such as through
discovery or mandatory pretrial disclosure; and (4) how society views
the propriety of allowing this evidence in a public resolution of a
dispute.
the transgression? These questions are directly related to the one posed above as to
the purpose of a trial. It presumes both the worst about the parties involved to allow
whatever is necessary to get to the truth, as well as the ineffectiveness ofthe discovery
process in dealing with tellers of non-truth.
42. Perhaps overly simplistic is more accurate.
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Illegally Obtained Evidence Necessary To File the
Action: No Crime, No Case

The first setting is one that any of us teaching at a law school
has most likely encountered each year. A student has rented an
apartment pursuant to a lease agreement that provides that the tenant
shall not have a pet, waterbed, unauthorized roommate, or the like. The
lease also provides that the landlord shall enter the apartment only for
necessary repairs and upon notice provided in advance at a specified
term, such as twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The tenant violates one
of the prohibitions. The landlord enters without the required advance
notice and not for an authorized purpose. While in the apartment in
violation of the lease, as well as of applicable trespass laws, the
landlord encounters the4 3offending pet, waterbed, or roommate. An
eviction action follows.
The availability of the illegally obtained evidence is of the
greatest possible significance to the case. Without the unlawful entry
into the apartment, there would most likely be no basis to maintain the
action, for the sole evidence of the breach of the lease is obtained
through the landlord's unlawful entry." Because the illegally obtained
evidence is required to commence the action, there would be no
discovery by which the evidence could be obtained.45 If the action had
been possible without evidence obtained from the trespass, the violation
would be disclosed in a truthful response to a simple discovery request
43. Cf Boston Housing Auth. v. Guirola, 575 N.E.2d 1100, 1106 (Mass. 1991)
(acknowledging that a landlord's unauthorized entrance into a tenant's apartment was
an illegal act that could give rise to questions of whether evidence gathered during the
entry should be admitted, but finding the landlord's entry was not unlawful).
44. Of course it is possible that a person lawfully on the premises could inform
the landlord of the conduct constituting the breach of the lease, but it seems unlikely
that a person invited into the apartment by the tenant would then be a witness against
the tenant.
45. Although FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b)(3) and many comparable state provisions do
provide for the filing of actions in which the factual allegations "have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery," it would be unlikely
that the landlord could meet the threshold of "likely to have evidentiary support"
without the unlawful entry into the apartment.
I do not mean to imply that eviction actions are regularly maintained in federal
court. I am using the Federal Rules as an example.
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or examination of the tenant at trial. However, if the tenant/litigant
were willing to give an untruthful and most likely perjurious response,
then the pet, waterbed, or unauthorized roommate could be removed or
hidden. Consequently, the search for the truth would have been
subverted. This raises the question: should the judicial system
countenance one illegal act in order to expose another?
According to society's view of the equities involved, both
landlord and tenant are wrongdoers. However, we do not view their
actions equally. The tenant has engaged in activity that, if it causes any
damages to the landlord at all, can be compensated financially. For
example, if a pet soils the carpet or if the waterbed leaks, the damage is
apparent upon move-out. Most likely, a security deposit provides a
readily available fund to compensate the landlord. If it is insufficient,
the landlord can seek redress.46 On the other hand, the wrong to the
tenant is an invasion of privacy, and the intangible nature of this wrong
makes financial compensation difficult, if not impossible, to measure.
Although the basic reasoning that two wrongs do not make a right is a
dangerously slippery slope, society would not seem to countenance an
invasion into a home, even to expose a wrongdoer or to advance the
search for the truth, when the truth is the existence of an unauthorized
pet or waterbed.
Because the tenant's wrong is minor, the need to expose the
illegal pet, waterbed, or roommate does not seem to justify the privacy
invasion that gave rise to the illegally obtained evidence. However,
what if the wrong sought to be exposed was not a minor lease
violation? Would society countenance the invasion of privacy in order
to expose racial or gender discrimination, or the tobacco industry's
engineering of cigarettes to make them more addictive, or an effort to
cover up a botched surgery? In those situations, the proprieties of
allowing evidence obtained by unlawful means substantially change.
Nonetheless, I have a difficult time imagining a situation in which the
wrong sought to be exposed is significant, but the existence of the
wrong is only known because of the illegal act. The landlord would
most likely not know of the pet or waterbed but for the unlawful entry.
Therefore, the action could not be maintained without it. However, the
unfairly treated employee, cancer-stricken smoker, or injured patient
would already be familiar enough with their respective injuries to

46. See, e.g., Duerne v. Alcime, 448 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (discussing generally that a landlord may bring a claim for damages).
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maintain an action within the constraints of Rule 11. 47 By maintaining
the action, the plaintiff has the opportunity to obtain through discovery
that which he or she may be tempted to obtain unlawfully.
B.

Illegally ObtainedEvidence Necessary To Prove a
Case, PartI: The Crime HappilyAdvances a Pending
Case

In the second situation, a case is pending, such as a race or
gender employment discrimination suit or a toxic tort action. The
plaintiff has been able to plead an adverse effect that he has allegedly
suffered because of the defendant's actions and therefore has a basis for
filing the case that meets obligations imposed by Rule 11 or a state
counterpart. 48 Nevertheless, meeting the burden of proof at trial on the
issue of causation will be extremely difficult. While the case is
pending, a disgruntled employee of the defendant provides the plaintiff
with a purloined "smoking gun" document that provides the proof
plaintiff needs. 49 Though the document should have been turned over
in discovery, it was not. It is only through the theft of defendant's
property that the actions of defendant giving rise to liability are
revealed. Because of the underlying nature of the action and the
unscrupulous tactics of the defendant, both in committing the
underlying wrong and in not disclosing the document in response to a
discovery request, society cheers the admission ofthe illegally obtained
document as it advances the search for the truth. Basic "two wrongs do
not make a right" reasoning is stood on its head. Society countenances
plaintiff's offering evidence obtained by illegal means because of both
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(3) (allowing a party to plead facts that do not have
evidentiary support without fear of sanction if such facts are "specifically so
identified" and "are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery").

48. Id.
49. One might wish to call this the Erin Brockovich, A CivilAction, etc. situation.
Compare Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891-92 (N.D. Ill.

2001) (excluding from evidence, in an employment sexual harassment case, a tape
recording that the plaintiff made during her exit interview without the knowledge or
consent of the participants to the conversation pursuant to applicable state
eavesdropping statute), with Knoll Assoc., Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283, 286
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (allowing documents into evidence obtained through thievery by
former employee against former employer).
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the nature of the wrong exposed and the fact that defendant has
committed a second wrong by subverting the discovery process. In a
sense, defendant has committed two wrongs that can be viewed as
outweighing plaintiffs one wrong.
This situation is also unique in that the plaintiff, the party
benefiting in the litigation from the illegal action of the disgruntled
50
employee, did not necessarily participate in the illegal action.
Therefore, allowing this evidence does not necessarily reward a party
for its own wrongdoing. Of course, in a strict sense the party
knowingly possesses stolen material, and a highly moral sensibility
might lead one to believe that the purloined document should be
returned to the rightful owner. However, because the rightful owner is
a wrongdoer, society does not expect such to happen. Even if the
injured plaintiff or her attorney participated in theft of the document,
society's view still does not change significantly. The exposure of the
wrongdoer remains adequate justification for the illegal act required to
bring it into the light of day, though such does not extend to all
wrongdoers. The societal repugnance of the quasi-public wrong
overshadows the unlawfulness of the action required to expose and
prove it. However, as was seen in the first scenario, when the exposed
wrong is perceived by society to be of a lesser degree of turpitude and
strictly between the litigants, a point is reached where the wrong
involved in obtaining the evidence is no longer outweighed by the
wrong that is exposed thereby.
C.

Illegally ObtainedEvidence Necessary To Prove a
Case, PartII: The Crime UnhappilyAdvances a
Pending Case

In the third situation, a divorce action is pending with adultery
as the alleged grounds. One of the parties gains information by
unlawful means about the other and seeks to use it to prove adultery.
The means range from opening or stealing mail 5 to bursting, camera in
50. Cf United States v. Prod. Plated Plastics, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 110506 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (discussing that when the party offering the evidence is not the
party that violated the opponent's privacy rights in its acquistion, the equities involved
do not justify the "societal cost" of excluding the evidence).
51. Cf Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 163 (Ct. Com. P1. 1966)
(refusing to consider letters apparently written by the wife to a former fiancd that were
taken from her car by her husband during divorce proceedings and apparently upon
advice of his attorney).
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hand, into a motel room in which the other is engaged in adulterous
acts. As will be discussed, it is significant that this situation appears
to be the context in which the doctrine of exclusion in civil actions
between private parties developed, and it is one of the most frequent
contexts in which it has been most often considered.53 It is also of
interest that these cases occurred at a time when adultery was the only
available grounds for divorce. Courts were then faced with the choice
between countenancing the unlawful act and invasion of privacy or
excluding the evidence, leaving the proponent
with no avenue to end
54
spouse.
adulterous
his
his marriage to
This scenario is similar to the second situation in that the action
could most likely be initially maintained without the illegally obtained
evidence, and the underlying adultery would be exposed by a truthful
answer to a question posed during a deposition or in an interrogatory.
However, unlike the second situation, this scenario reflects a significant
change in recent decades in society's view of the equities involved. We
do not necessarily cheer the illegally obtained revelation, as we would
the exposed polluter or exposed perpetrator of discrimination. In this
respect, it more closely resembles the first situation in which the
landlord engages in trespass in order to expose or catch the tenant in a
relatively minor wrong. While the exposed adulterer is engaged in
conduct society does not wish to foster, the conduct is not such that it
leads to condemnation of the same magnitude as applied to the
discriminating employer or toxic polluter. As this Article discusses, it
is through this third situation that the doctrine of admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence developed. The development, however,
occurred at a time when society's view of adultery was much different
and less tolerant. As a result of this shift of viewpoint, society might
52. Cf Del Presto v. Del Presto, 223 A.2d 217, 217-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1966) (excluding evidence obtained from a raid by wife, her son, police, and private
investigator, upon the apartment of husband's lover during which photographs were
taken and visual observations were made), rev'd, 235 A.2d 240, 247 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1967); Sackler v. Sackler, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790, 796 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(excluding evidence including photographs obtained by a husband's forceful entry and

raid of his wife's separate apartment in order to obtain evidence of adultery), rev'd,
229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1962), aff'd, 203 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1964).
53. See discussion infra Parts IV, IX.
54. The choice of the male pronoun is purposeful. The reported cases almost
uniformly involve a male seeking divorce by proving the adultery of his spouse.
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also now abhor the privacy invasion encompassed in obtaining the
evidence and restore basic "two wrongs do not make a right" reasoning.
This is especially true when truthful answers to discovery should lead
to the peaceful and lawful disclosure of what had to be previously
obtained by illegal means in order to aid the search for the truth. Of
course, if the adulterer is not truthful in response to discovery requests,
that additional wrong is added to the equation.
D.

Attorney Misconduct: A Separate Issue

These three situations are by no means exhaustive, but they
provide a framework within which to examine the question of the
admission of illegally obtained evidence. Though it does not involve
activity that subjects the actor to civil or criminal liability, evidence
obtained by an attorney in violation of applicable rules of professional
conduct also deserves mention. For example, an attorney may have
engaged in misrepresentation when interviewing a potential witness 56 or
communicated directly with a party the attorney knew to be
represented.57 Neither course of conduct is illegal, but both violate
professional rules of ethics.58 The admission of evidence obtained in
such manner gives rise to the dilemma of whether courts should
participate in or condone improper conduct. When confronted with
these situations, courts have not approached them in a consistent
manner. Some have found that the ethical violation does not preclude
the admission of the improperly obtained evidence. 59 Others have
55. See generally Erica M. Landsberg, Policing Attorneys: Exclusion of
Unethically ObtainedEvidence, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1399 (1986) (discussing ethical
constraints on attorney behavior in gathering evidence and calling for an exclusionary
rule as the most effective means to enforce professional obligations).
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 ("In the course of

representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of

material fact or law to a third person .... ).
57. See id. R. 4.2 (2002) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of
the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.").
58. Of course, it is an ethical violation for a lawyer to obtain evidence by

unlawful means. See id. R.4.4 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means
that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a

person.").
59. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Geneva, 357 N.E.2d 829, 836-37 (Ill. App. Ct.

Summer 2003]

ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

641

60
excluded the evidence based upon the violation of ethical principles.
Another approach when improper contacts have occurred in pending
litigation is for courts to find a subversion of the discovery process that
warrants the exclusion of the evidence, while at the same time
expressing concerns for lapses in ethical conduct. 61 The breadth of the
topic warrants its own article beyond the scope allowed herein. The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from obtaining
evidence by means that "violate the legal rights" of a person; 62 the
related issue regarding the professional obligations of the attorney when
considering offering into evidence something which has been illegally
obtained by someone else is less clearly addressed.

IV.

THE TRADITIONAL RULE AT ITS INCEPTION

Judicial discussion of the traditional rule of allowing evidence
in civil cases without regard to its source has been less than cursory,
especially when compared to that devoted to the exclusionary rule
1976). The Geneva court held:
While we, like plaintiff, are concerned with the practice of contacting
members of the opposing class, which presents the opportunity to
misrepresent the nature and effect of the class action and to encourage
defection, we have found no Illinois rule or case law which would allow us to
exclude such evidence. We therefore decline to exclude this evidence.
Id. (footnote omitted).
60. See, e.g., Cagguila v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 653, 655 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (excluding evidence obtained when counsel for plaintiff contacted an employee
of defendant corporate counsel without notifying defense counsel).
61. See, e.g., Bruske v. Arnold, 254 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ill. 1969) (excluding a
statement made during the pendency of litigation by a represented defendant to a
private investigator hired by plaintiff and noting that the importance of ascertaining
the truth must sometimes yield to enforcement ofthe rules ofprofessional conduct and
discovery); see also Trans-Cold Express, Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc., 440 F.2d
1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1971) (excluding evidence derived from an interview of
plaintiff's agent conducted by a private investigator hired by the defendant who failed
to notify plaintiff's attorney or to dispel the misconception of the witness that the
investigator worked for plaintiff on the basis of improper expert testimony, indicating
the "desirability of deterring improper investigative conduct").
62. See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2002).
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based on the Fourth Amendment. When faced with a party seeking to
exclude something from admission into evidence because it has been
obtained illegally from that party by the opponent, the courts most often
simply recite the common law doctrine that evidence is to be admitted
without consideration of how it was obtained.63 Of course, if the rule of
law is settled, further exploration is pointless. However, because the
concept of personal privacy and the process of civil litigation were still
evolving at the time that the exclusionary rule was developing, it would
be expected that more discussion of the issue would be appropriate. As
this Article discusses, while an exclusionary rule based on the Fourth
Amendment could be dismissed as inapplicable to civil actions, an
exclusionary rule based upon concerns of judicial integrity and the
supervisory powers of the court would not be confined to governmental
actors and criminal prosecutions. 64 Nevertheless, the issue has received
extremely short shrift and has not been fully addressed by the courts.
The context in which the issue has been raised, in terms of both
the nature of the underlying action and society's view of the parties
involved, may have contributed to the paucity of judicial reasoning
involved. The cases largely involve divorces sought from adulterous
spouses. 65 Courts allowed the cuckold to admit into evidence letters
stolen from the post office or the addressee, photos or other evidence
obtained from unlawful entries, and the like. 66 The reasoning of those
courts, however, was neither well argued nor strongly argued. The
issues have not been fully addressed. Many of the seminal opinions
drew vigorous dissents. The reasoning employed was often little more
than a statement that no existing precedent prevents the admission of
illegally obtained evidence. 67 At times it was weak, arguing that
stealing letters from the post office constituted an offense that the court
was "not prepared to call [a] crime," 68 even though the offense was
considered a "high crime and offence" punishable by "transport[ation]
beyond the seas for life.",69 Additionally, some courts reasoned that the
proper remedy lay in criminal or civil penalties, or both, rather than in
the exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evidence, with the search for
63. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 467 (1928).
64. See discussion infra Parts VIII, IX.
65. See supra Part III.C.
66. See sources cited supra notes 51-52.
67. See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468.
68. Rattray v. Rattray, 35 Scot. L. Rep. 294, 296 (Sess. 1897).
69. Id. at 295. Mr. Rattray escaped banishment beyond the seas and was instead
sentenced to seven days of imprisonment. Id. at 294-95.
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the truth trumping the need to sanction the perpetrator of the unlawful
act.7
The societal and legal setting of the early decisions is instructive
as to what may have been behind the shallow reasoning of the courts.
These decisions date back to the late 1800s. Divorce was a rarity and
was granted in some jurisdictions solely on the grounds of adulteryuntil
approximately the last forty years.7 ' Sexual relations outside of
marriage were considered immoral acts. Sex between a married person
and someone other than that person's spouse was condemned.
Therefore, in the absence of the broad-based discovery of the present
day, courts may have been motivated to admit illegally obtained
evidence in order to allow the cuckold the benefit of the only proof
available to meet the burden of proving the only grounds available for
divorce. 72 The most frequently cited case in the early Anglo-American
line of decisions admitting illegally obtained evidence, Rattray v.
Rattray,73 involved a determination of whether adultery had been
proven. 74 A letter stolen from the post office was the best proof
offered.75 The court allowed its admission, yet found the grounds
unproven. 76 Because the cases frequently involved a husband seeking
to prove adultery, one could easily imply sexism, allowing the male
cuckold the evidentiary benefits of his unlawful act to provide him with
the only exit from his marriage.
Therefore, the development of the traditional rule occurred in a
setting like that of the second scenario.7 7 Suppose that a case is
pending against a party who has committed a societal wrong. It was a
relatively secret wrong that would most likely not be exposed without
70. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
71. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204-08 (2d ed.
1985) (discussing the evolution of grounds upon which divorce could be granted).
72. See Recent Case, Husband's Unreasonable Search Bars Admission of
Evidence of Wife's Adultery in His Suit for Divorce, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1043, 1047
(1962) ("Since [the] law grants divorce only on the basis of adultery, the aggrieved
spouse must often face the choice of violating the civil rights act or of retaining an
adulterous partner; hence it is not surprising that some divorce-seekers would choose
to violate the act.") (footnote omitted).
73. 35 Scot. L. Rep. 294 (1897).
74. Id. at 296-97.
75. Id. at 297.
76. Id.
77. See supra Part III.B.
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illegally obtained evidence. Without the evidence, the wrong would go
unproven, and the aggrieved party would have no redress. The question
for the present then becomes, when what was once comparable to the
second scenario has transformed itself into the third, 78 do changed times
warrant a changed rule? It is my belief that if the evidence could have
been obtained through discovery, then it should not be allowed when
obtained by unlawful means.

V.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS
EVER-EVOLVING BASIS

The unwillingness of courts to inquire into how evidence was
obtained began to abate in the context of unlawful actions by
government officials in regard to criminal prosecutions. Concerns for
searches and seizures considered unreasonable in light of the Fourth
Amendment, as well as for prevention of self-incrimination pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment, led the Supreme Court to abandon the common
law tradition of admitting evidence without regard for how it was
79
obtained in a quartet of cases decided in a span of thirty-five years.
Interestingly, three of the opinions were authored by Justice Day.80 As
previously stated, the exclusionary rule is not the only situation in
which evidence is deemed inadmissible because of the way it was
obtained, 8 but because the unlawful search aspect is most closely
analogous to the unlawful actions of a private party in obtaining
evidence, it serves as the best avenue for discussion. A brief
examination of its development is instructive as to the source or sources
of judicial authority for its creation. It is also instructive because it
shows how a balance was struck between the cost of the search for the
truth by the exclusion of relevant evidence and the societal goal of
curbing governmental actions that threaten personal privacy.
In the context of governmental actors violating constitutional
guarantees in criminal prosecutions, the common rule of admitting
78. See supra Part III.C.
79. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475 (1921) (Day, J.); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (Day, J.); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594
(1904) (Day, J.); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (Bradley, J.).
80. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 465; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383; Adams, 192 U.S. at
585.
81. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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evidence without consideration for how it was obtained was abandoned
by the Supreme Court in 1914 in Weeks v. United States.82 After being
charged with using the mails to transport lottery coupons, Mr. Weeks
sought the return, prior to trial,83 of private papers obtained by state
84
officers and federal marshals in two separate warrantless searches.
The trial court denied Mr. Weeks's petition as to papers related to the
charge against him and additionally denied his later objections at trial
based upon the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when the papers were
introduced into evidence against him. 5 He was found guilty and
appealed the trial court's refusal to return his papers to him and
subsequent allowance of their introduction into evidence.86 The
Supreme Court reversed as to the actions of the marshal, finding that
the warrantless search violated rights secured by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. 87 Justice Day's opinion reasoned that exclusion must
necessarily follow as the only effective remedy for the unlawful
gathering of evidence:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of
an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
82. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).

83. Justice Day's opinion seems to find itimportant that the question of return of
the illegally obtained evidence was raised prior to trial: "Nor is it [the situation before
the Court] the case of testimony offered at a trial where the court is asked to stop and
consider the illegal means by which proofs, otherwise competent, were obtained...."
Id. at 392. The Court was concerned with collateral matters subsuming an ongoing

trial. Id. at 396. As noted, this is one of the rationales for the common law rule of
ignoring the source of evidence. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also
infra note 191 and accompanying text.

84. Id. at 386. The state officers entered Mr. Weeks's home without a warrant by
means of a key, the whereabouts of which was revealed to them by a neighbor. Id.
Having found some papers, which they turned over to the federal marshal, they
returned with him-again without a warrant-and were allowed entry by a person
presumed to be a boarder. Id. Again, papers were seized and removed. Id.
85. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 388-89.

86. Id. at 389.
87. Id. at 393.
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88

While the reasoning of the Court seems unequivocal that
exclusion is the only effective means of enforcing Fourth Amendment
guarantees, the underlying basis could have been more fully explained,
especially in light of the opinion's rejection of a long-standing common
law rule. It would have been instructive for the Court to address the
rationales of the common law rule it was rejecting, such as the desire to
avoid collateral litigation, the availability of other remedies, and the
need of the search for the truth of all available evidence. 89 The opinion
merely concludes that exclusion is the only effective remedy, without
explanation about why a suit for damages against the offending officials
would not be adequate. 90 It brushes aside the concern for collateral
litigation by stating that the pre-trial context of Mr. Weeks's original
petition makes it not a concern in the instant context. 9' Little more is
stated.
In deciding Weeks, the Court had to address two prior decisions
that pointed in opposite directions regarding whether the manner in
which evidence had been obtained should affect its admission into
evidence. Twenty-eight years prior, in Boyd v. United States,92 the
Court had addressed a federal statute that required a claimant in a
forfeiture case to produce documents that were then used by the district
attorney, over objection, against the claimant who had been compelled
to produce them. 93 The Court found the statute unconstitutional as
violative of both the Fifth Amendment guarantee against selfincrimination and the Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 94 Although Boyd did not involve a
search or seizure, thus lending it to criticism for its reliance upon the
Fourth Amendment as a "fallacious conclusion" because the case could
have been decided "on simple Fifth Amendment grounds," 95 the
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
90. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.

91. Id. at 395-96.
92. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
93. Id. at 619-20.
94. Id. at 621-38 (containing a lengthy discussion of how the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments are intertwined, as well as the importance of the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures in both England and the United States).
95. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2184a, at 32; see also Boyd, 116 U.S.
at 638-41 (Miller, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the holding as to the Fifth
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opinion's Fourth Amendment discussion is most frequently cited as
giving birth to the concept of exclusion of evidence that was illegally
obtained by the government. 96 In Weeks, the Court relied upon and
extended the reasoning of Boyd, holding that exclusion is the only way
97
to effectuate protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
While Boyd apparently set the stage for the exclusionary rule,
Adams v. New York, 98 decided ten years and one day prior to Weeks and,
interestingly, also authored by Justice Day, seemed to rein in Boyd and
stop the movement toward exclusion. In Adams, the Court considered
the admissibility of documents taken during a search pursuant to
warrant but not within the parameters of the authorized search. 99 In
affirming the rejection of defendant's objection at trial to the admission
of the illegally obtained papers, the Court repeated the common law
mantra that "the courts do not stop to inquire as to the means by which
the evidence was obtained."'100 The Court's prior decision in Boyd had
to be addressed. Justice Day, without directly overruling Boyd,
favorably mentioned Justice Miller's dissent, which had criticized the
Fourth Amendment holding, and went on to state that "nearly all of the
American cases have declined to extend this doctrine to the extent of
excluding testimony which has been obtained by such means, if it is
otherwise competent."'' 1 Ten years later, Justice Day, writing for a
unanimous Court in Weeks, did an about-face and repeatedly cited Boyd
with approval, holding that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment should be excluded. 10 2 Adams was unpersuasively
distinguished on the basis that the objection to the illegally obtained
evidence was made at trial, while in Weeks it was made before trial,
03
thereby not requiring the trial court to consider a collateral matter.'
Amendment, but disagreeing with the majority holding that the Fourth Amendment
analysis is necessary or appropriate because there was neither a search nor a seizure).
96. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1914).
97. Id. at 393 ("If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment ... might as well be stricken from the Constitution.").
98. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
99. Id. at 598-99.
100. Id. at 594.
101. Id. at 598.
102. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397 (1914).

103. Id. at 396.
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The doctrine of exclusion was not off to the most illustrious of
beginnings.
Seven years later, Justice Day would write the majority opinion
in Burdeauv. McDowell,10 4 defining and limiting the extent of the new
rule of Fourth Amendment exclusion. Mr. McDowell had sought the
return of documents in possession of Mr. Burdeau, a special assistant
attorney general, who intended to use them as evidence in the
prosecution of Mr. McDowell. 10 5 The documents had been stolen by
unknown parties. 10 6 The Court, with Justice Day again writing for the
majority, rejected Mr. McDowell's Fourth Amendment claim, holding
it inapplicable due to the lack of any governmental action in the
wrongful taking of the papers.l17 Justice Brandeis wrote a brief dissent
with which Justice Holmes concurred, arguing that although there may
not have been a violation of constitutional prohibitions, governmental
actions and the pursuit of justice should not countenance unlawful
08
action.'
Thus, the common rule that courts do not inquire into the means
by which offered evidence was obtained now held an exception for
evidence unlawfully seized by government actors. What remained
unclear, however, was whether the rule of exclusion was based upon
Constitutional mandate or had a non-constitutional basis, such as the
supervisory power over the lower federal courts. Some language of the
opinion indicates that the rule found its basis in enforcement of
constitutional guarantees:
The tendency of those who execute criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often
obtained after subjecting accused persons to
unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by
the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution and to which people
104. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
105. Id. at 470.
106. Id. at 470-71.
107. Id. at 475.
108. Id. at 477 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Respect for law will not be advanced
by resort, in its enforcement, to means which shock the common man's sense of
decency and fair play.").
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of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.10 9
Other language hints that illegally obtained evidence should also be
rejected as a matter of judicial integrity, as courts should not give
recognition to evidence obtained by unlawful acts: "To sanction such
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect
if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended
for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action."'' 0
The issue grew in importance as courts in later decisions
wrestled with whether the exclusionary rule was applicable to state
proceedings.I1 Furthermore, an explanation of the rationale employed
by the Court for the exclusion in criminal cases of unlawfully obtained
evidence would also have been instructive as to the application of the
doctrine to civil cases. If the exclusionary rule is based upon
constitutional mandate emanating from the Fourth Amendment, there
can obviously be no application to the private actors in civil litigation.
However, if exclusion is based upon the supervisory powers of the
Court or a concern for the integrity of the judicial process, the question
of applicability to civil actions then becomes more pertinent because
the ramifications are comparable.
Though the developing criminal case law firmly ensconced the
exclusionary rule within the Fourth Amendment, at least for the time
being, 112 the source of legal authority and the policy reasons for
exclusion have often been unclear and perhaps malleable, depending
upon the exigencies of the case at hand. Boyd, involving the
109. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
110. Id. at 394.
111. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.

112. The exclusionary rule has not gone long without its critics. See, e.g., People
v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (refusing to recognize the
applicability of exclusionary rule to the states and criticizing it generally, stating that
criminals should not go free "because the constable has blundered"); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465,496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the exclusionary rule
and calling either for discarding it or for a substitute rule); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§§ 2183-2184, at 6-53 (discussing and criticizing the development of the exclusionary
rule).

The last twenty years have seen a considerable scaling back of its application,
most noticeably in UnitedStates v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,904 (1984) (adopting a"good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule).
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constitutionality of a compelled disclosure statute rather than an illegal
search, was based upon a convergence of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, resulting in the inadmissibility" 3 of evidence procured
pursuant to the unconstitutional statute. Adams, which used an analysis
based solely on the Fourth Amendment, appeared to reject Boyd's
concept of the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
constitutiorial protections. 14 Nevertheless, Weeks found the Fourth
Amendment to be a basis for a rule of exclusion as the only effective
means of enforcing constitutional guarantees." 5 The Weeks holding
was also based on the rationale that courts should neither involve
themselves with nor countenance unlawfully obtained evidence. 1 6 This
rationale apparently had a legal basis separate and distinct from the
Fourth Amendment: the supervisory powers over the federal courts,
also referred to as a concern for judicial integrity.
The precise basis for the exclusionary rule became more
important as the Court was called upon to resolve whether illegally
obtained evidence should be excluded from state prosecutions. If the
rule were based solely upon the Court's supervisory powers over the
federal courts, there would not be justification for applying the rule to
the states.' 1 7 However, a basis rooted in the Fourth Amendment could
be extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. It was on
18
the latter basis that the battle lines were drawn. In Wolfv. Colorado,'
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did make the Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure applicable
to the states.'1 9 However, it also held that the rule of exclusion was not
a component of the constitutional guarantee but rather "a matter of
judicial implication." 120 Eleven years later, in Elkins v. United
States,121 the Court again stated that the basis for the exclusionary rule

113. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
115. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
116. Id. at 398.
117. See Arthur G. LeFrancois, On Exorcisingthe ExclusionaryDemons: An
Essay on Rhetoric, Principleand the ExclusionaryRule, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 49, 59
(1984) ("Surely, the Court's supervisory power does not extend to the imposition of
evidentiary rules on the state courts.").
118. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
119. Id. at 27-28.
120. Id. at 28.
121. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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was rooted in "the Court's supervisory power. ' 122 Elkins addressed
what had become known as the "silver platter doctrine." 123 In federal
prosecutions following the Weeks ruling that the Fourth Amendment
had no applicability to state actors, the silver platter doctrine was used
to admit evidence that had been unlawfully obtained by state officials
without any federal involvement. By finding the basis for the
exclusionary rule to be the Court's supervisory powers, rather than the
Fourth Amendment, Elkins was able to extend the exclusionary rule to
silver platter situations. At the same time, Elkins further articulated that
the rationale justifying exclusion was deterrence, rather than
124
reparation.
The holding in Elkins, based on supervisory powers, left the
Court without power to apply the exclusionary rule to state
prosecutions. Nevertheless, less than two years later in Mapp v.
Ohio,125 the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states, finding it
indeed to have a constitutional basis in the Fourth Amendment as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 126 Mapp
echoed the Elkins rationale of deterrence as the only effective means to
guarantee protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 127 The
Court also
mentioned concerns of judicial integrity as an additional
128
reason.

VI.

EXCLUDING EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO SUPERVISORY POWERS
IN ORDER TO PRESERVE JUDICIAL INTEGRITY

The evolution of the legal basis of an exclusionary rule from a
matter of supervisory powers to one of constitutional command was
accompanied by a corresponding evolution of the underlying rationales
for the rule. What began as a matter both of deterrence, as the only
effective means of constitutional protection, and of the preservation of
judicial integrity, soon became solely a means for deterring unlawful
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 217.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 659.
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behavior.129 This rationale shift permitted the development of
exceptions to what had proven to be a very controversial doctrine.130 If
the exclusionary rule were viewed as a matter of judicial integrity, it
would lead to much more of a bright-line rule commanding exclusion.
An unlawful act is largely an unlawful act. If courts should not become
involved with such evidence, then there is not much room for
exception. However, if the purpose of the rule is deterrence, then courts
can construct exceptions to the rule of exclusion in situations in which
the goal of deterrence would not be forwarded by exclusion, such as an
illegal search made in good faith.' 3 ' This solution answers critics of the
32
rule without discarding it altogether, which some critics have urged. 1
Nevertheless, the ability to exclude evidence as a matter of inherent
supervisory power to oversee the administration of justice 133 was not
totally discarded and has been mentioned
by the Court as recently as
134
States.
United
v.
Dickerson
in
2000,
The use of supervisory power alone to exclude evidence was
first most effectively championed by Justice Brandeis's dissent in
Olmstead v. United States. 135 In Olmstead, the majority held that a
suspect federal wiretap was not an unreasonable search and seizure
136
under the Fourth Amendment, nor was it prohibited by statute.
Therefore, the majority allowed the illegally obtained evidence under
129. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (stating that
deterrence is the "prime purpose" of the rule "if not the sole one"); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465,486 (1976) ("The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is
the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.").
130. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2183-2184, at 6-53 (criticizing
greatly the exclusionary rule and the decisions leading to its development); People v.
Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (summarizing the main criticism
of the rule with the oft-repeated line, the criminal shall "go free because the constable
has blundered").
131. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (creating an exception
to the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained as a result of good faith reliance on a
warrant later found to be defective).
132. See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (calling for
discarding of the rule in entirety); id. at 538, 542 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing for a
good faith exception to the rule).
133. See generally Nathan E. Ross, The Nearly ForgottenSupervisory Power:
The Wrench to Retainingthe Miranda Warnings, 66 Mo. L. REv. 849, 849-66 (2001)
(discussing the development and sources of authority of supervisory power to exclude
evidence).
134. 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
135. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
136. Id. at 457-66.
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the common law tradition that admissibility of evidence is not affected
by its having been unlawfully obtained. 137 In a strongly worded dissent,
Justice Brandeis argued that illegally obtained evidence should be
excluded in order to "maintain respect for law; in order to promote
confidence in the administration of justice; [and] in order to preserve
the judicial process from contamination."' 38 In McNabb v. United
States,139 the Court held that evidence obtained during interrogations
occurring over a two-day period violated "'fundamental principles of
liberty and justice"' and should not be allowed into evidence. 140 The
holding was based not on constitutional grounds, but rather on
supervisory powers.'41 Similarly, the Elkins Court, citing the dissent of
Justice Brandeis in Olmstead,142 relied upon supervisory power to
exclude evidence turned over to federal agents by state officers who
obtained it unlawfully, thereby overruling the "silver platter"
43
doctrine. 1
The extent of supervisory power to exclude evidence was cast in
some doubt in UnitedStates v. Payner.144 The Court declined to use its
supervisory power to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained from a third
person not a party to the pending prosecution and therefore not within
the purview of the Fourth Amendment. 14 On one hand, the opinion
can be read as collapsing supervisory powers into constitutional
analysis, holding that supervisory power to exclude evidence extends no
further than the constitutional power. 146 On the other hand, though, the
137. Id. at 467.
138. Id. at 484-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
139. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
140. Id. at 340-41 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
141. Id. at 341 ("Quite apart from the Constitution, therefore, we are constrained
to hold that the evidence elicited from the petitioners in the circumstances disclosed
here must be excluded.").
142. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960).
143. Id. at 206-08.
144. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
145. Id. at 733.
146. Id. As the PaynerCourt noted:
The District Court and the Court ofAppeals believed, however, that a federal

court should use its supervisory power to suppress evidence tainted by gross

illegalities that did not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The
United States contends that this approach-as applied in this case-upsets
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opinion reads as if it is fact-specific 147 and as if the exercise of
supervisory power to exclude evidence remains appropriate after a
balancing of the harms occasioned by the unlawful activity from which
the evidence was obtained and the harms of excluding relevant
evidence.148 Because the illegally obtained evidence was not obtained
from the person against whom it was offered and was not objected to by
the person from whom it was obtained, it does seem that the Court
could balance the harms in such a case to allow the evidence without
negating the existence of the supervisory power. 149 Justices Marshall,
Brennan, and Blackmun dissented, arguing that the integrity of the
activities are ratified through the
judicial system is at risk when illegal
50
evidence.'
resultant
of
admission

VII.

BALANCING EXCLUSION AGAINST THE SEARCH FOR THE
TRUTH

From its inception to the present day, the exclusionary rule has
always had its critics.151 As perhaps most famously stated by Judge
Cardozo, the criticism centers around the compromise of the search for
the careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amendment decisions
of this Court. In the Government's view, such an extension of the
supervisory power would enable federal courts to exercise a standardless
discretion in their application of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. We agree with the Government.
Id.
147. Id. (using the limiting language "as applied in this case").
148. Payner,447 U.S. at 734 ("But our cases also show that these unexceptional
principles [deterring deliberate and unlawful intrusions into privacy] do not command
the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they must be weighed
against the considerable harm that would flow from indiscriminate application of an
exclusionary rule.").
149. Id. at 735 ("We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize a
federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was
seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court.").
150. Id. at 746 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If the federal court permits such
evidence, the intended product of deliberately illegal Government action, to be used to
obtain a conviction, it places its imprimatur upon such lawlessness and thereby taints
its own integrity.").
151. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2183-2184, at 6-53; 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2 (3d
ed. 1996) (discussing and citing criticism as well as support for the exclusionary rule).
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the truth by the exclusion of evidence: "The criminal [will] go free
because the constable has blundered."' 152 Numerous Justices have
called for its demise or modification.' 53 Because the exclusionary rule
evolved into solely a matter of deterrence of government conduct
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, exclusion of evidence is
necessary not as a punishment in a specific case, but as the only
effective deterrent against improper government action. This evolution
makes the rule subject to exceptions when the goal of deterrence would
not be served-by exclusion, thereby answering critics who have decried
the rule as compromising the search for the truth. Two such exceptions
are most deserving of note. The "good faith" exception reasons that the
goals of deterrence are not served when the actors involved believed
they were acting within the law. 154 Therefore, the reasoning continues,
the compromise to the search for the truth cannot be countenanced
when the goal of deterrence is not served. 155 Operating on the other
side of the balance is an exclusion for illegally seized evidence offered
to impeach the testimony of the defendant.156 Whatever price is exacted
from the search for the truth by the exclusionary rule is considered too
great when a defendant takes the stand and lies. Although evidence has
been obtained illegally, it is allowed to impeach an untruth. 57 Both
exceptions attempt to strike a balance, albeit an imperfect one, between
deterring the unlawful seizure of evidence and allowing evidence in
152. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
153. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (arguing for discarding the exclusionary rule in the present case as
opposed to awaiting a preferred substitute doctrine).
154. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984) (allowing the
admission of evidence, although illegally obtained, when the officer involved acted in
good faith reliance on an invalid warrant).
155. Id. at 907 (discussing that without deterrence there is nothing to offset "the
substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule").
156. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1954) (holding that
illegally obtained heroin was admissible for the sole purpose of impeaching the
defendant's testimony that he did not purchase or possess narcotics); United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) ("[A] defendant's statements made in response
to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct
examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit
by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is inadmissible ....
").
157. See Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 ("[T]here is hardly justification for letting the
defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's
disability to challenge his credibility [because evidence was unlawfully obtained].").
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order to further the search for the truth. No similar attempt has been
made in civil cases. The common law tradition of admission without
regard to the source has prevailed. As this Article discusses, the
availability of broad discovery shifts the balance so that the price
exacted from the search for the truth is not nearly as great.

VIII.

THE USE OF SUPERVISORY POWER To PRESERVE JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY IN CIVIL CASES

There is a point to all of the discussion of the Court's opinions,
other than just that the Supreme Court has issued some confusing
rulings that make the basis for the exclusionary rule an evolving
expediency. The opinions show a recognized concern for a
compromise to judicial integrity when a court admits evidence that has
been obtained by means of an illegal act. That concern should be given
equal weight in civil as well as criminal matters, for the countenance of
an illegal act is the countenance of an illegal act no matter whether in a
criminal or civil proceeding. Admittedly, the absence of governmental
involvement in the illegal act distinguishes the civil and criminal
situations. Society is perhaps less likely to countenance illegal actions
by governmental actors. However, society most likely also does not
want private parties to benefit from their unlawful acts, and there is a
cost to judicial integrity when courts allow that to happen. Therefore, it
is my contention that the availability of civil discovery diminishes the
need for illegal evidence as an aid in truth-seeking to the point where
the cost to judicial integrity is not justified. Consequently, the
supervisory power should be exercised to exclude illegal evidence in
civil cases. Although the Court has exercised its supervisory powers
with much greater frequency in criminal matters, it has also done so in
158
comparable civil cases to reform procedures in the federal courts.
158. See Sara Sun Beale, ReconsideringSupervisory Power in CriminalCases.
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1449 (1984) ("Although supervisory power has been used
much more frequently in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has occasionally
employed supervisory power for similar purposes in civil cases."); David E. Melson,
FourteenthAmendment-CriminalProcedure: The Impeachment Use of Post-Arrest
Silence Which Precedes the Receipt of Miranda Warnings, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1572, 1576 (1982) ("In McNabb, the Court reversed a murder
conviction on the basis of its 'supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts.' In the forty years since that decision, the Court has
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EXCLUDING EXCLUSION FROM CIVIL ACTIONS

"[Eixceptions to the demandfor every man's evidence are not
lightly creatednor expansively construedforthey are in derogationof
159
the searchfor truth.'
In the United States, when the development of the exclusionary
rule reached the decision in Mapp v. Ohio,160 a few courts hearing
divorce cases in the mid-1960s applied its holding to exclude illegally
obtained evidence in civil actions. As a result, evidence was not
allowed as proof of adultery in a divorce action because it had been
stolen by a spouse, apparently upon the advice of counsel, from the car
of the other spouse; 161 because it had been obtained by a spouse and
accompanying private investigators from a raid upon the apartment of a
paramour of the other spouse; 162 or because it was procured by a spouse
during a forced entry into the separately maintained apartment of the
other spouse. 163 These cases were either reversed on appeal for
improperly relying on Mapp or simply not followed by later
decisions. 164 The result was the general continuation of the traditional
65
doctrine of acceptance of illegally obtained evidence in civil cases.1
exercised its supervisory power in both civil and criminal cases and has brought about
significant reforms in federal lower court procedure.") (footnote omitted).
159. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
160. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
161. See Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 163 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1966)
(citing Mapp and refusing to consider letters apparently written by the wife to a former
fiancd that were taken from her car by her husband during divorce proceedings and
apparently upon the advice of his attorney).
162. See Del Presto v. Del Presto, 223 A.2d 217, 217-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1966) (following Mapp in excluding evidence obtained from a raid by the wife,
her son, police, and private investigators upon the apartment of the husband's lover
during which photographs were taken and visual observations were made).
163. See Sackler v. Sackler, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790, 795-96 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (relying
upon Mapp to exclude evidence, including photograph obtained by the husband's
forceful entry and raid of his wife's separate apartment in order to obtain evidence of
her adultery), rev 'd, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1962), aff'd, 203 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y.
1964).
164. See Sackler, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (reversing lower court's suppression of
evidence).
165. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d
721, 729 (W. Va. 1994) ("[T]he exclusionary rule is not usually extended to civil
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Although the Mapp holding and the application of the Fourth
Amendment is limited to governmental actors, what was not considered
was whether reasons other than the holding of Mapp warranted
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in civil cases. The supervisory
powers basis for exclusion is not limited to governmental actors, but the
fact that it was discarded as the basis for a rule of exclusion for Fourth
Amendment violations 66 caused it to be forgotten as a judicial
consideration when the issue of illegally obtained evidence arose in
civil cases.' 67 It is quite interesting that both the traditional rule of
admitting evidence without regard to how it was obtained and the brief
reversal of the rule originated in the context of spouses' seeking to
prove adultery. One could hazard a guess that by the mid-1960s the
availability of increased opportunities for civil discovery, the
development of and grounds for divorce in addition to adultery, and a
changed societal view of the unfaithful spouse may have caused a few
courts to believe that the search for the truth no longer justified
invasions of privacy and receiving evidence generated by criminal
activity.

X.

LIMITED LEGISLATIVE ACTION

In certain limited areas, Congress and many state legislatures
have acted to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence from civil as well
as criminal cases. Most notable are statutes that make it unlawful to
intercept electronic communications1 68 and exclude any interception

cases."); In re Marriage of Cohen, 545 N.E.2d 362, 367-68 (I11.
App. Ct. 1989)
(affimning the admission into evidence of psychiatric evaluations of children
conducted in violation of court's previous order enjoining such); Knoll Assocs., Inc. v.
Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (refusing to exclude documents stolen
from corporation's files by a former employee because the lack of government
involvement caused the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable).
166. See discussion supra Parts VI, VII.
167. See, e.g., Charles B. Robson, Jr., Note, Evidence-Admissibility in Civil
Actions of Evidence Illegally Obtainedby PrivatePersons,43 N.C. L. REv. 608, 613
(1965) (discussing Sackler and stating that a civil exclusionary rule would be better
based upon grounds rooted in policy than in the Constitution).
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000) (making it unlawful to intercept, use, or
disclose an intercepted electronic communication). For an example of a state statute,
see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(a)(1) (1993) (prohibiting the recording of any
conversation without the consent of all participating parties).
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from introduction into evidence.' 69 Such statutes certainly reflect a
concern for protection of privacy, as well as for not allowing a party to
benefit in litigation from an unlawful intrusion into private
communications. However, it is unclear why the prohibition must be
limited. Legislative history reveals no clues. 170 One could hazard a
guess that because the intrusion can be accomplished without detection,
the offended party may be unaware of it and is therefore in need of
special protection. However, other methods of pirating evidence are
equally elusive of detection, such as stealing a posted letter or
photocopying a private document by stealth. There are, of course, civil
and criminal remedies available for such behavior, but the evidence is
not excluded. 17 1 It would seem that the same reasons for excluding
unlawfully intercepted electronic communications would warrant
excluding other forms of evidence unlawfully obtained. Nevertheless,
legislatures have not chosen to act in this area. Additionally, it is not
apparent why the clandestine nature of the interception should
necessarily warrant special legislative treatment. Why protect secretive
intrusions into privacy but not more obvious ones, such as theft of a
document that would be detected? It makes one wonder whether more
obvious invasions of privacy were not afforded special legislative
protection because legislatures thought that their more obvious nature
made them subject to exclusion from evidence.

169. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000) (prohibiting the admission into evidence of
unlawfully intercepted electronic communications). For an example of a state statute,
see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(b) (prohibiting the use or disclosure of a
recorded conversation obtained by means of unlawful eavesdropping).
For an example of the application of 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(b), see
Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891-92 (N.D. 111. 2001)
(granting defendant employer's motion in limine in an employment case of alleged
sexual harassment, thereby excluding a tape recording made by plaintiff of her
termination interview without the consent of the participants).
170. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2154-58 (1968) (discussing in general terms the
need to prevent unauthorized wiretapping and the use thereof as evidence).
171. See 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 2, § 2184a, at 48-53.
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"lit may, of course, be argued that the refusal to permit the
reception of evidence of adulterygatheredthrough an unlawful search
promotes immorality and the negation of the marriagevows. That
argument, however, is untenable,
since adultery may be proved by
17 2
law."
the
within
means
other
Illegally obtained evidence has been admitted under the notion
that the search for the truth trumps other concerns. The question of
whether a party may have engaged in illegality to get evidence is of no
matter. The primary concern is whether the evidence advances the case
toward the truth. Exclusion has only been sanctioned where necessary
to further a constitutional mandate. Nonetheless, should the courts
allow illegally obtained evidence in situations in which it is not
necessary to aid the search for the truth? In other words, what if the
evidence could have been readily obtained through lawful means? The
breadth of the scope of discovery in civil actions presents that exact
question.
Parties may obtain discovery of any matter that is not privileged
and that is "relevant to the claim or defense of any party."' 173 Therefore,
any evidence that would be sufficiently relevant to be admissible would
be subject to discovery. The need to illegally obtain evidence is
obviated. A party seeking to establish another spouse's adultery need
172. Sackler v. Sackler, 229 N.Y.S.2d. 61, 70 (App. Div. 1962) (Hopkins, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964).
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Federal Rule 26(b)(1) provides:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules,

the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court
may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by
Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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not kick in the door of a motel room to obtain photographic proof. A
truthful answer to an interrogatory or a question asked at deposition will
provide the answer. Even if what became known to a party through
some unlawful action is later obtained lawfully through discovery, there
is significantly less taint to the integrity of a court. 17 4 The court has not
countenanced an illegality.
Of course, people lie. It would be incredibly na've to expect a
truthful answer to every discovery request, let alone to construct a rule
of evidence upon an assumption of unfailing truth on the part of parties
to litigation. Consequently, an exception for the admission of illegally
obtained evidence for purposes of impeachment should be recognized,
as with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.' 75 The relative
proprieties of the parties involved are thereby reordered to something
that is much more acceptable to society. The proponent of evidence
that he obtained by breaking the law is not rewarded for the bad act
because the evidence is not admissible. At the same time, the use of the
evidence for purposes of impeachment does not allow the party against
whom it is offered to shamelessly lie without recourse.' 76 The
fundamental concept from equity of not approaching the court with
unclean hands is preserved. This harkens back to the dissent of Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead, from which was born the concept of excluding
illegally obtained evidence pursuant to supervisory power. 177
174. See Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1969)
(affirming the trial court's order returning illegally seized evidence and at the same
time allowing the obtaining of the same information through "authorized discovery" as

an "independent source").
175. See State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721,

729-30 (W. Va. 1994) (affirming the trial court's exclusion of evidence obtained in a
civil case by an unlawful surveillance but finding it an abuse of discretion to prohibit
the use of that evidence for purposes of impeachment).

176. Id.
177. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-84 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Brandeis stated in his dissent:
The governing principle has long been settled. It is that a court will not

redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands. The maxim

of unclean hands comes from courts of equity. But the principle prevails
also in courts of law. Its common application is in civil actions between
private parties.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The broad scope of discovery in civil matters has caused trials to
no longer provide for the Perry Mason type of disclosures of
determinate facts. 178 Therefore, if the search for the truth no longer
requires the resort to illegally obtained evidence, two questions must
then be asked. First, is there a diminution in the perception of the
integrity of the court when it accepts illegally obtained evidence even
though such is not needed to aid the search for the truth because it is
available from another source? Second, what effect does allowing a
party to benefit from an illegal act have upon the view of a trial as a
mechanism of dispute resolution? In other words, is there any
diminution of our satisfaction with the result if the result was based in
whole or in part on an underlying illegal act?
The first question echoes the same concerns expressed by the
Court in relying in part upon its supervisory powers to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of constitutional mandates against unlawful search
and seizure--deterring unlawful conduct and maintaining judicial
integrity. The supervisory powers have been most frequently relied
upon in criminal actions, but they have also been utilized in a variety of
civil actions as well. 179 Though no longer viewed as a basis for the
exclusionary rule, supervisory powers have been relied upon to correct
matters that impact the integrity of the judicial process, such as the
exclusion from jury pools of a "large class of wage earners." 180 It is
interesting that in other contexts courts have not allowed parties to
benefit from illegal or fraudulent acts. For example, service of process
procured by fraud has been held to be void. 18 1 Similarly, parties should
not be allowed to benefit from an illegal acquisition of evidence.
Therefore, the Court should rely upon its supervisory power to exclude
illegally obtained evidence from civil cases except when offered for
178. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)
("Modem instruments of discovery serve a useful purpose ....They together with
pretrial procedures make a trial less a game of blindman's buff [sic] and more a fair
contest with the basic facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.").
179. See sources cited supra note 158.
180. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (noting that a jury
selection process was improper because of "the admitted wholesale exclusion of a
large class of wage earners in disregard of the high standards of jury selection").
181. See Voice Sys. Mktg. Co., L.P. v. Appropriate Tech. Corp., 153 F.R.D. 117,
120 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (granting motion to quash summons served "through deception
and trickery"); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1937) (affirming
dismissal of case where service had been obtained by fraud perpetrated upon the
defendant, inducing him to enter the jurisdiction).
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purposes of impeachment. By so doing, both judicial integrity and the
search for the truth are preserved.
The Court's decision in United States v. Payner must be
reconciled. The Court held that "the supervisory power does not
authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on
the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before
the court."' 82 In reaching that holding, the Court reasoned that the
"costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth" caused
by
the exclusion of competent, but illegally obtained, evidence must be
weighed against the principles obtained by its exclusion. 183 What must
be considered in effectuating that balance in a civil case is that the
availability of discovery diminishes any harm to the search for the truth.
The information can be sought through discovery. If the party lies or
hides the answer, the door is then opened to impeach with the otherwise
inadmissible evidence. If the evasion of a truthful answer is sufficiently
egregious, the offending party is subject to sanction, including being
defaulted in the action. 184 Either in addition or as an alternative to that
sanction, the party could be requested to admit the fact in question
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36, and if after refusal the
fact is established at trial, the party could be assessed the costs of
making that proof.185 Consequently, the effect upon the search for the
truth is much less affected by the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence in civil cases, and the balance suggested by Paynerbetween
harm to truth-seeking and other values weighs in favor of exclusion.
One of the main rationales given for the exclusion from
evidence of things obtained by illegal governmental action is that the
remedies available to the wronged person are not sufficient to render
the person whole. Therefore, exclusion of the illegal evidence is
warranted in criminal actions. However, in civil actions the notion of a
remedy short of exclusion prevails. 186 A closer examination reveals,
182. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980).
183. Id. at 734.
184. See FED. R. Crv. P. 37 (providing sanctions for failing to answer a question
propounded in discovery, or for providing evasive or incomplete answers, or for
failure to disclose information either required as an initial disclosure or a
supplementation thereto, or in response to a request to admit).
185. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(c)(2).
186. See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 596 (1904) ("'A trespasser
may testify to pertinent facts observed by him, or may put in evidence pertinent
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however, that the available remedies are not adequate. 17 It would seem
highly unlikely that criminal charges would be filed in at least two, if
not all three, of the contexts for discussion. The landlord who has let
himself into the apartment in violation of the lease has committed a
trespass, but that trespass is upon property the landlord owns and most
likely entered by using a master key so that no physical damage
resulted. The same would be true for the stolen piece of paper that
establishes a pattern of employment discrimination or toxic polluting.
Perhaps a criminal charge might result from entering the hotel room to
catch the adulterous spouse in the act, but that would seem dependent
upon whether physical damage to property resulted and who would be
the complainant. If the unlawful entry took place in a motel, the
offended adulterer would not be the one who could most likely seek to
have charges pressed. However, criminal redress does not seem
available.
As for civil remedies, it is extremely difficult to measure
damages resulting from a peaceful unauthorized entry into an
apartment, from the theft of a piece of a paper, or from being
photographed while engaged in adultery. The adultery situation
presents a more compelling claim for invasion of privacy than does the
landlord-tenant situation, but the plaintiff in both is a person who has
committed a wrong and is trying to sue because he or she was caught.
These are certainly not the most compelling facts upon which to
recover. Damages could be measured by the value of the actual
damage, if any, but that results in unsatisfying anomalies such as trying
to ascertain the value of a piece of paper in the discriminating employer
situation. 88 Finally, should there be a concept of being damaged by
losing a lawsuit as a result of evidence obtained illegally?' 89 This is
articles or papers found by him while trespassing. For the trespass he may be held
responsible civilly, and perhaps criminally; but his testimony is not thereby rendered
incompetent."') (quoting Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 32 N.E. 910,911 (Mass. 1893)).
187. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-47 (1948) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(arguing in favor of the criminal law exclusionary rule because, in part, other available
remedies for the wrong by which the evidence was obtained are "illusory").
188. See State Forester v. Umpqua River Navigation Co., 478 P.2d 631,637 (Or.
1970) (stating that, in deciding not to exclude evidence in the form of an arguably
unlawful inspection and tests of certain equipment, "[iut could be argued that under the
traditional rules of damages, the award would be so trivial that pursuing a civil remedy
might not be worthwhile").
189. See Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtainedby
Private Parties, 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1075 (1963) ("[It is difficult to characterize
possible victory or defeat in a lawsuit resulting from the unlawfully obtained evidence
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especially the case when the evidence serves to reveal the truth of that
suit. Punitive damages would seem to remain equally elusive. The
evidence gatherer has engaged in a willful act, but punitive damages are
imposed to serve as punishment. Therefore, it is difficult to punish a
person for a willful act that
resulted in the gathering of evidence that
0
exposed another wrong.19
Whether or not other available remedies are adequate to
compensate the party from whom evidence has been unlawfully
obtained, it is my thesis that there is a harm to the judicial system when
a party gains an advantage in a civil suit, including one that advances
the truth, as a result of an act that was unlawful in regard to the person
against whom it is offered. This is especially the situation when the
evidence could have been obtained through available discovery
mechanisms. There is a harm to the system of justice that was
previously recognized during the early development of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule, but that has slipped into the judicial
ether. When that harm is unnecessary as an aid to the truth, there is no
reason for it to be countenanced.
Courts declining to exclude illegally obtained evidence have
also cited a desire to not encourage collateral litigation.191 That concern
does not seem justified for several reasons. First, when courts admit
illegally obtained evidence while stating that other remedies are
available to the aggrieved party, they are encouraging other litigation.
The wronged party in most actions would seem to be able to
counterclaim for the trespass occasioned by the actions by which the
evidence was obtained. It is also not convincing that a determination to
exclude illegally obtained evidence would be any more cumbersome
that any other evidentiary determination. Congress and federal courts
have addressed the procedures for such determination in the context of
as the injury suffered by the victim of the illegal search.").
190. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 43-44 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that exclusion
is the only effective remedy for a person from whom evidence has been unlawfully
obtained). As the Wolf Court stated, "If the evidence seized was actually used at a
trial, that fact has been held a complete justification of the search, and a defense
against the trespass action." Id.
191. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2183, at 6-7 (discussing thatjudges should
not attempt to investigate and punish "incidental offenses" during the course of a
specific litigation and that, therefore, illegally obtained evidence should be admitted
without inquiry into its source).
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excluding unlawfully intercepted electronic evidence. 92
The
clandestine nature of electronic surveillance presents a particular
challenge that 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) addresses by a burden-shifting
mechanism that allows the aggrieved party to raise the claim of
unlawful action in obtaining the evidence that then requires the
opponent to "affirm or deny the occurrence of the unlawful act." 193 In
situations that do not involve such clandestine actions, such as theft of a
document that could not otherwise have come into the possession of the
proponent or kicking down the door of a motel room to take
photographs of adulterous activities, the overt nature of the unlawful act
removes concerns for burdensome collateral litigation. Therefore, this
concern does not warrant the admission of the evidence in the face of
192. 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (2000). Section 3504, regarding "[litigation concerning
sources of evidence," provides:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of
the United States-(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it
was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of
the claim shall afTr or deny the occurrence of the alleged
unlawful act;
(2) disclosure of information for a determination if evidence is
inadmissible because it is the primary product of an unlawful act
occurring prior to June 19, 1968, or because it was obtained by the
exploitation of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968,
shall not be required unless such information may be relevant to a
pending claim of such inadmissibility; and
(3) no claim shall be considered that evidence of an event is
inadmissible on the ground that such evidence was obtained by the
exploitation of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, if
such event occurred more than five years after such allegedly
unlawful act.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful act" means any act [involving] the use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device (as defmed in section
2510(5) of this title) in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant
thereto.
Id.
193. See Margaret V. Sachs, Comment, Claiming Illegal Electronic
Surveillance:An Examination of 18 US.C. § 3504(a)(1), 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
632, 633 (1976) (discussing the statute generally, as well as issues presented by the
burden shifting mechanism).
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the reasons for its exclusion.

XII.

CONCLUSION

The traditional rule of admitting evidence without regard to
whether it was obtained by unlawful means is rooted in the notion that
the aid of the evidence to the search for the truth trumps countervailing
concerns for invasion of privacy and judicial integrity. However, with
the broad scope of discovery in civil cases, the search for the truth is not
as impeded presently as it previously would have been by the exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence. Therefore, the traditional rule deserves
reconsideration, and illegally obtained evidence should not be admitted
as it exacts a cost to judicial integrity.

